Declining Discount Rates: Economic Justifications and Implications for Long-Run Policy by Gollier, Christian et al.
DECLINING DISCOUNT RATES   1  
 
 
Declining Discount Rates: 
Economic Justifications and 
Implications for Long-Run Policy 
 
 
Christian Gollier, Phoebe Koundouri, Theologos Pantelidis 
IDEI, Université Toulouse I; DIEES, Athens University of Economics and Business; DEFA, National University 
of Ireland Maynooth 
 
June 2008 
 
Abstract. 
The use of a Declining Discount Rate (DDR), in cost-benefit analysis (CBA), compared to 
the use of a Constant Discount Rate, implies that the policy maker will put relatively more 
effort to improve social welfare in the far distant future than in the shorter time. The choice 
between the two discount rates is crucial and linked, for example, to the problem of 
whether we should fight malaria and AIDS (which have immediate effects) rather than 
climate change (which is expected to have important long-term effects). In this paper we 
assess the willingness to pay for (very) distant benefits, which should inform the 
desirability of policies and projects with immediate costs and distant benefits. DDRs offer 
an approach to balancing current costs and distant benefits. First we present the existing 
theoretical justifications for using a DDR, which are mainly driven by the uncertainty of 
future economic conditions, and show how a theory-consistent optimal trajectory of the 
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DDR can be estimated. For this empirical estimation, we use regime-switching models of 
the optimal trajectory of the DDR for nine ‘representative’ countries. We then compose a 
weighted average rate that can be used in CBA of long-term projects that affect the global 
environment and economy.  Finally, we investigate the policy implications of applying this 
optimal trajectory on the cost-benefit evaluation of carbon mitigation policies and compare 
our results with those of the Stern Review. This comparison provides empirical evidence 
that support the major criticism of the Stern Review of assuring high damage numbers by 
using an arbitrary low and constant discount rate. Our main point in this paper is that when 
uncertainty is introduced, the case for DDRs and the availability of a reliable empirical 
method for their estimation become compelling for CBA of long-run policies and projects. 
 
JEL Classification: C22; Q53. 
Keywords: discount factor; discount rate; regime-switching model; climate change; Stern 
report. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The realization that actions taken today can have long-term consequences, presents a new 
challenge to decision makers in assessing the desirability of policies and projects, a 
challenge summarized as the goal of ‘sustainable development'. The use of the classical net 
present value (NPV) rule to assess the economic efficiency of policies with costs and 
benefits that accrue in the long-term is problematic. The welfare of future generations 
barely influences the outcome of such a rule when constant socially efficient discount rates 
are used for all time. The deleterious effects of exponential discounting ensure that projects 
that benefit generations in the far distant future at the cost of those in the present are less 
likely to be seen as efficient, even if the benefits are substantial in future value terms. From 
the perspective of social choice, the present yields a dictatorship over the future. This is 
illustrated in the conclusion of the Copenhagen Consensus in which different public 
investment projects have been examined by a panel of prestigious economists. Using 
standard cost-benefit analysis (CBA), they ranked projects with distant benefits (e.g. 
global warming) at the lowest level of priority compared to programs yielding almost 
immediate benefits (e.g. fighting malaria and AIDS, and providing sanitation in 
developing countries). 
 In this paper we attempt to assess the willingness to pay for distant benefits, which 
should inform the evaluation of (very) long-run policies and projects, in the presence of 
uncertainty about future economic conditions. This is a challenging task on the basis of 
existing evidence, not only because of market imperfections, but also because more in this 
than in other contexts, the future may be very different from the past. Recent economic 
literature on long-run CBA, proposes the use of a discount rate which declines with time, 
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according to some predetermined trajectory. In comparison with the use of a constant 
discount rate, using a DDR raises the weight attached to the welfare of future generations. 
Indeed, DDRs offer a nice and nuanced approach to the balancing of current costs and 
(very) distant benefits. Following this literature, the key assumption of our framework of 
analysis is that of a declining, but time-stable structure of discount rates. This assumption 
allows us to connect the representative-individual intergenerational theory and the 
empirical treatment of country-specific historical data. To do this, we utilize a univariate 
model (which describes the uncertainty in the behavior of interest rates) and very long 
historical data (which captures centuries of historical events that affect the stochastic 
characteristics of the interest rate series) to describe the stochastic dynamics of the real 
interest rate and estimate a theory-consistent schedule of DDR for nine ‘representative’ 
countries. These country-specific DDR schedules are then used in a CBA of the global 
climate change mitigation policy. 
 In a nutshell, in this paper we answer the following questions. What formal 
justifications exist for using a DDR? If we accept the theoretical arguments for DDRs, how 
one can estimate the shape and behavior of these discount rates? And, what are the policy 
implications of applying the optimal trajectory of DDRs on the issue of whether emissions 
reduction should be given higher priority than other investments we make in our everyday 
life. 
 In section 2 we focus on the determination of efficient social discount rates and 
their term structure, given the impact of uncertainty about future economic conditions. 
Theory suggests that (in an uncertain economic environment) it is the persistency of the 
shocks on the growth rate of consumption (in the consumption-based approach) and of the 
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shocks on short-term interest rates (in the production-based approach) which determines 
the shape of the term structure of the socially efficient discount rate. These two 
explanations are coherent with each other: persistent shocks on growth expectations 
translate into persistent shocks on interest rates, both yielding DDRs. Moreover, in the last 
part of section 2 we argue that equating non-constant discount rates with time-inconsistent 
behaviour is a fallacious interpretation of the literature. In section 3 we empirically 
estimate country-specific optimal time trajectories of the social discount rate, based on the 
theory of the production-based approach to DDRs. We first discuss the availability of 
appropriate data and the selection of appropriate econometric models for such an 
estimation. Our objective is to compose a weighted average rate that can be used in CBA of 
long-term projects that affect the global environment and economy. The use of this 
aggregate interest rate is based on the anticipation of a better international cooperation on 
the challenges raised by global changes to our planet. 
 One of the most important contributions of this paper is that it proposes how the 
optimal, theory-consistent, long-run trajectory of the decline in discount rates can be 
estimated, without the use of a structural model. It is true that the relevant literature 
contains numerous studies that define a structural model where the yield curve is 
determined by a number of factors, such as the growth rate of consumption, or the 
short-term interest rate. However, all structural models are based on specific assumptions 
and their behaviour is sensitive to these assumptions. Empirically, structural models often 
lead to “economic puzzles” since they fail to explain what is actually observed in the 
markets. Structural uncertainty about extreme bad events (such as world wars and 
geophysical catastrophes) changes dramatically the dynamics of a structural model. 
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Moreover, the rareness of extreme bad events makes it difficult to estimate accurately their 
possibility of occurrence based on available historical data. In general, structural 
parameters are empirically difficult to estimate and as a result the behaviour of structural 
models depends critically upon the prior beliefs of the researcher.  
An alternative way to describe the dynamics of interest rates is by means of a 
simple univariate time series model where the future properties of the interest rate are 
determined by its own past behaviour. The uncertainty surrounding the future path of the 
interest rate (captured by the uncertainty of the estimated parameters of the univariate time 
series model) leads to DDRs. We argue that the empirical simplicity and 
theory-consistency of this approach (i.e. utilization of a univariate model for the interest 
rate) makes it preferable to the alternative approach of utilizing a structural model for 
characterizing the dynamics of interest rates. We, therefore, choose to perform the 
empirical analysis of this study by means of univariate time series models. 
In section 4 we use our estimates for policy simulation. In particular, we illustrate 
the implications of using the estimated trajectory of DDR in the cost-benefit evaluation of 
carbon mitigation policies and the conclusions of the Stern report. The Stern Review 
represents a radical departure from earlier estimates of the economic significance of 
climate change damages. The significance of climate change is seemingly increased by an 
order of magnitude. It is thus natural that it is being hotly debated. The most widely 
debated issue in economic circles following the Review was the choice of the discount rate. 
Stern has been criticized of assuring high damage numbers by using low discount rates. 
The main policy implication of our paper is that the utilization of an arbitrary low constant 
discount rate profile (like the one adopted by the Stern Review) generates substantially 
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higher values for the social cost of carbon as well as the damages from climate change, 
when compared to the respective values generated by the utilization of our robustly 
estimated, optimal long-run trajectory of the decline in discount rates. These results 
indicate that a declining discount profile can correct the insufficient representation of 
future generations, but at the same time better maintain that current generations discount 
the future. This reveals the importance of having an empirically convenient and reliable, as 
well as theory-consistent, empirical method for estimating this trajectory. In our 
concluding section we argue that the resulting difference in the present value calculations 
is significant enough to call the attention of the policy maker. Moreover, our results have 
implications for cost-benefit analyses of long-run policies, in general, as well as the 
ranking of projects with immediate and distant benefits. 
 
2. DETERMINATION OF EFFICIENT SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATES: THE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 This section outlines how standard economic theory can imply DDRs. In section 
2.1 and 2.2, we review the two standard approaches for the determination of the socially 
efficient discount rates and their term structure. We link the two approaches in section 2.3, 
whereas we discuss in section 2.4 the issue of time inconsistency that arises when DDRs 
are used.  
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2.1 The Consumption-based Term Structure of Discount Rate 
 Consider a marginal investment project that reduces current consumption by ε and 
raises consumption by rte ε  at date t with certainty. The return of this project is r. Its effect 
on intertemporal welfare is 
 0'( ) '( ),
rt t
tu c e e Eu c
ρ−− +   
where ct is consumption at date t, ρ is the rate of pure preference for the present, and u is 
the increasing and concave utility function. This certain investment project is positive 
(negative) if its return r is larger (smaller) than δt which is defined as  
 
0
'( ) .
'( )
t t t tEu ce e
u c
δ ρ− −=  
Thus, δt is the socially efficient discount rate associated to cash-flows at date t. If we 
assume a power utility function with γ−= ccu )(' , and if we suppose that 0ln lnt tX c c= − is 
normally distributed, the above equation simplifies to 
 ( )0.5 (1 ) ,tt t
Var Xg
t
δ ρ μ μ μ= + − +  (1) 
where 1 0ln( / )t tg t Ec c
−= is the expected annualized growth rate of consumption. Equation 
(1) is the Ramsey rule (Ramsey (1928)) extended to an uncertain growth of the economy. 
μ  represents the representative agent’s preferences for smoothing consumption that is 
growing over time at a rate g and is known variously as the elasticity of inter-temporal 
substitution, the elasticity of marginal utility of income, and inequality aversion in that it 
measures the curvature of the utility function u. It is mathematically equivalent to the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), defined by ''( ) / '( )cu c u cμ = − . It measures 
the percentage reduction in marginal utility when consumption is increased by 1%. 
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 The intuition of the Ramsey rule when Var(Xt)=0, i.e., when there is no uncertainty, 
is simple. When the growth rate gt of consumption is large, the marginal utility of future 
consumption is small, and the willingness to invest for the future is limited. This justifies a 
large discount rate. Why would we sacrifice current consumption in favour of future 
generations which will be so much wealthier than us anyway?1 This would be socially 
efficient only if the return of the investment would be large enough to compensate for the 
increased intergenerational wealth inequality that it would generate. This wealth effect 
specified by μgt in the Ramsey equation, is proportional to the elasticity of marginal utility, 
i.e., to μ. If we assume that ρ=02 and [1,2]μ ∈ ,3 the socially efficient discount rate should 
lie between the growth rate of consumption and twice it. 
 It is of course very difficult to predict the distant future. When we introduce 
uncertain growth rates of consumption, the Ramsey rule must be extended to take into 
account a precautionary motive by subtracting the precautionary term 
10.5 (1 ) ( )tt Var Xμ μ −+  in the right-hand side of equation (1).  As shown in Gollier (2002a,b) 
this effect comes from the convexity of marginal utility, which tends to raise the expected 
marginal utility of future consumption when it is uncertain. This precautionary saving 
motive reduces the socially efficient discount rate, and this effect is proportional to the 
index 1+μ=-cu'''(c)/u''(c) of convexity of u’. It is intuitive that a prudent agent is willing to 
                                                 
1 At a 2% growth rate per year, consumption will be more than 50 times larger in 200 years than today. 
2 Pearce and Ulph (1999) summarize various estimates of the appropriate utility discount rate. They conclude 
that the component for impatience (the ‘rate of pure time preference’) lies between zero and 0.5 percent (best 
guess 0.3%), although they note that there is no clear view about the exact value of the rate of pure time 
preference. At this point, it is fair to mention that philosophers and many economists (including Ramsey) 
have long argued that for social decisions, anything other than a zero rate of pure time preference is unethical. 
3 The classic source on the estimation of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is Stern (1977). Recent 
reviews are Cowell & Gardiner (1999), Pearce and Ulph (1999), and Evans and Sezer (2002).  
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sacrifice a larger fraction of current wealth to improve a more uncertain future. This is done 
by reducing the discount rate. 
It is often overlooked that the (extended) Ramsey rule (1) is a theory of the term 
structure of interest rate. The socially efficient discount rate δt  is a function of the time 
horizon t through the potential time-dependency of gt and t-1Var(Xt). If the growth of the 
economy is expected to accelerate, i.e., if gt is increasing, then the term structure of 
discount rates should be increasing. But an accelerating or a decelerating growth is never 
certain. This is why all recent attempts to justify a decreasing time structure of discount 
rates relied on introducing uncertainty into the picture. Once the context shifts to one of 
uncertainty, the case for DDRs becomes compelling.  
Let xt = lnct-lnct-1 denote the growth of the log consumption between date t-1 and t. 
It implies that 
1
t
tX xττ == ∑ . If the growth process is stationary, i.e., if the x1, x2,… are 
i.i.d., both tg  and t
-1Var(Xt) are independent of t, and the term structure of discount rates 
tδ  should be flat. Suppose alternatively that there is some form of persistence in shocks on 
consumption. Positive serial correlations in growth rates per period will make the 
annualized variance 2tσ  increasing in t. According to the extended Ramsey rule above, this 
would imply DDR to be socially efficient. Intuitively, persistence will imply that the very 
distant future will be particularly uncertain, which reinforces the precautionary motive to 
reduce the discount rate for these long time horizons.  
 This argument is developed in more details in Weitzman (2007b) and Gollier 
(2007). The first writer builds a “statistical optimal growth model” by combining a 
neoclassical economic model of optimal growth under uncertainty with a fully integrated 
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Bayesian statistical model of estimating, updating and predicting the outcome of this 
uncertainty. His model is able to produce persistent uncertainty in the interest rate and as a 
result DDRs. From a different point of view, mainly driven by the existing finance 
literature on the term structure of interest rates, Christian Gollier reaches similar 
conclusions with more flexible preference functionals and stochastic growth processes. He, 
specifically, finds that a positively correlated growth process leads to a decreasing yield 
curve in the case of a prudent representative agent due to increased uncertainty for the 
distant future. 
 
2.2 The Production-based Term Structure of Discount Rates 
 In the previous section, it was assumed that the investment was financed though a 
reduction of current consumption. Suppose alternatively that it is financed through a 
reduction of other productive investments. By a standard arbitrage argument, the discount 
rate that should be used to evaluate the new investment project equals the rate of return of 
the marginal investment in the production sector, which is the equilibrium interest rate in 
the economy. Let xτ  denote the interest rate from τ-1 to date τ, which may be uncertain 
from date t=0. Then the net present value of an investment that costs ε today and yields a 
benefit t teδε  at date t equals  
 1
t
t
xtENPV E e e ττδε ε =−⎡ ⎤∑= − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
Equalizing the expected net present value to zero characterizes the socially efficient 
discount rate, which must thus be such that 
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t
t
xte E e ττδ =−− ⎡ ⎤∑= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (2) 
 
Suppose first that the short-term interest rate is stationary, i.e., that x1, x2,… are 
i.i.d.. This implies that 
 1ln xt Eeδ −= −  
for all t. When shocks on interest rate are temporary, the term structure of socially efficient 
discount rates is flat. Suppose alternatively that short-term interest rates x1, x2,… are 
perfectly correlated. In that case, equation (2) can be rewritten as  
 1 .t t x te E eδ− −⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
Following Weitzman (1999), it is easy to show that δt is decreasing with the time horizon t.  
Thus, persistence in shocks on interest rates plays a key role in DDRs. 
Simple time series models can describe the uncertainty in the behavior of interest 
rates and it is uncertainty, together with persistence of the interest rates that leads to DDRs. 
This can be illustrated in the context of a simple autoregressive model of order one, i.e. 
AR(1). Specifically, assume the following AR(1) model for the interest rate, xt:  
),0(~,, 21 htttttt iidNhhpeeecx σ+=+= −  
where the mean of the process, c, is normally distributed with mean c and variance 2cσ .  
The higher 2cσ  is, the greater the uncertainty that surrounds the mean interest rate. On the 
other hand, the closer p gets (in absolute value) to unity, the more persistent the interest rate 
is. Newel and Pizer (2003) prove that the forward discount rate at time t in the future is: 
),(22 tpftcx hct σσ −−=  
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where ),( tpf is an increasing function in t and p. Thus, the forward discount rate decreases 
with uncertainty (measured by 2cσ and 2hσ ) and persistence (measured by p).  
The AR(1) model described above is a discrete-time version of Vasicek’s (1977) 
model since it is linear with regards to the mean and it assumes a constant variance for the 
process. Since Vasicek’s seminal paper, numerous studies in the finance literature 
proposed alternative models for the term structure of the interest rates. For example, Cox et 
al. (1985) relaxed the constant variance assumption by allowing the variance process to be 
a linear function of the level of the interest rate, while a few years later Chan et al. (1992) 
defined the variance process as a power function of the level of the interest rate. On the 
other hand, Hamilton (1988, 1989) argued that models with time-varying parameters 
provide a better framework to describe interest rates compared to models with constant 
parameters and he suggested a regime switching model for the interest rates. Regime 
switching models are well suited to capture the non-linearities in interest rates and thus 
they became very popular in empirical studies (see, among others, Gray (1996), Ang and 
Bekaert (2002)). 
Box 1. Uncertainty and DDRs: An Example 
           The following simple example illustrates how uncertainty about the future path of the 
discount rate increases the present value (PV) of a future cash-flow and leads to Declining 
Discount Rates (DDRs).  
           Assume that a project generates a cash-flow of €1000 after t years. Under scenario A, 
there is no uncertainty about the level of the discount rate in the future, which we assume to be 4 
percent. The second column of Table B1 reports the PV of €1000 for different time horizons. 
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Under scenario B, there is a low level of uncertainty about the future discount rate. Specifically, 
the rate could be either 3 percent or 5 percent with equal probability. Note that the average 
expected rate is 4 percent (=0.5*0.03+0.5*0.05). In this case, the expected PV of €1000 received 
after t years is 0.5*1000*e-0.03t+0.5*1000*e-0.05t. The third column of Table B1 presents the PV of 
the cash-flow for different time horizons. It is obvious that the PVs are now higher compared to 
the PVs under scenario A as illustrated in the fifth column of Table B1. For example, if the 
cash-flow is generated after 200 years, the PV under the low-uncertainty scenario (i.e. scenario 
B) is about 3.7 times higher than that under the no uncertainty scenario (i.e. scenario A). Note 
that the difference between the PVs of the two scenarios increases with the time horizon. Finally, 
under scenario C, there is a high level of uncertainty about the future rate. Specifically, the rate 
could be either 1 percent or 7 percent with equal probability (note that the average expected rate 
is once again 4 percent). In this case, the PV of the €1000, reported in the fourth column of Table 
B1 for different time horizons, is substantially higher compared to the PV under scenario A. The 
calculated differences between the PVs of scenario A and C, reported in the last column of Table 
B1, are now significantly higher compared to the differences between the PVs of scenario A and 
B. For example, when the time horizon is 200 years, the PV under the high-uncertainty scenario 
(i.e. scenario C) is more than 200 times higher than that under the no uncertainty scenario (i.e. 
scenario A). Once again, the difference between the PVs of the two scenarios increases with the 
time horizon.  
           In summary, this example illustrates that uncertainty about the future discount rates 
increases the expected PV of future payoffs. Moreover, the increase in the expected PV of future 
payoffs is higher for higher levels of uncertainty and it is also higher for payoffs in the distant 
future. This results in forward discount rates that decline over time (i.e. DDRs) as proved by 
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Weitzman (1998). The DDRs for scenario B and C are shown in Figure B2. The discount rate of 
the high-uncertainty scenario declines with the time horizon much faster compared to the 
discount rate of the low-uncertainty scenario. However, in both cases the discount rate tends to 
the lower possible rate (that is 3 percent under scenario B and 1 percent under scenario C). 
 
Table B1: Present Value of a cash-flow of €1000 received after t years 
 
t Scenario A: 4% 
Scenario B: 
3% or 5% 
Scenario C: 
1% or 7% 
Percentage 
difference 
between A,B 
Percentage 
difference  
between A,C 
1 960.7894 960.8375 961.2218 0.005 0.045 
10 670.3200 673.6744 700.7114 0.500 4.534 
50 135.3353 152.6076 318.3640 12.763 135.241 
100 18.3156 28.2625 184.3957 54.308 906.766 
150 2.4788 5.8310 111.5788 135.241 4401.412 
200 0.3355 1.2621 67.6681 276.220 20071.564 
300 0.0061 0.0619 24.8935 906.766 405054.203 
400 0.0001 0.0031 9.1578 2630.823 8137639.571 
 
Figure B2: The forward discount rates 
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2.3 Linking the Two Approaches of DDRs 
 In a frictionless economy, it is irrelevant to know whether the new marginal 
investment project would be financed by a reduction in current consumption, or by a 
reallocation of capital, since the equilibrium interest rates equals the return on capital and 
the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution. Applying the extended Ramsey rule for a 
one-year horizon, we obtain that the equilibrium interest rate must equal 
 21 1 0.5 (1 ) ,gδ ρ μ μ μ σ= + − +  
where g1 is the expected growth rate and σ2 is the variance of the growth rate of 
consumption. This means that there is a direct link between shocks on expectations about 
the growth of the economy, and shocks on the short-term interest rate.  
 We have made clear in the previous sections that it is the persistency of the shocks 
on the growth rate of consumption (in the consumption-based approach) and of the shocks 
on short-term interest rates (in the production-based approach) which determines the shape 
of the term structure of the socially efficient discount rate. The above equation shows that 
these two explanations are coherent with each others. Persistent shocks on growth 
expectations translate into persistent shocks on interest rates, both yielding DDRs. 
 In this paper, we use the production-based approach to DDRs. We have collected 
data to test for the persistence of shocks on interest rates, and we use equation (2) to 
characterize the term structure.   
In reality, the two approaches are not perfectly equivalent in the real world. 
Distortionary income taxation alone will cause the return on capital to be larger than the 
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution. Imperfect competition, externalities in 
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production and consumption, differences in the value of investment and consumption etc. 
will also cause a divergence. All of these factors require consideration in any given 
circumstance when conducting CBA. Much of the debate about discounting has concerned 
when and whether it is appropriate to use the consumption-based approach or the 
production-based approach, or some combination of the two. Furthermore, the specific 
Social Discount Rate (SDR) used for CBA will reflect the numeraire against which all 
costs and benefits are valued. Most commonly in CBA consumption is used as the 
numeraire, and thus δ  is often referred to as the ‘consumption rate of interest’.  Changing 
the numeraire will change the level of the SDR, but will not change the outcome of the 
NPV rule. 
  
2.4 Time Inconsistency 
 It has been clear since at least Strotz (1956) that the myopic use of non-constant 
discount rates results in time inconsistent plans. Dynamic inconsistency, or equivalently 
‘time inconsistency’, arises when a plan determined to be optimal at a particular point in 
time is not optimal when considered at a later point in time.  In this case, if the planner is 
unable to somehow commit future planners to the original plan, the plan will eventually be 
abandoned.   
 Equating non-constant discount rates with time-inconsistent behaviour is a 
fallacious interpretation of the literature. Let us make clear that an exponential discounting 
of future utility, which implies time-consistency, is compatible with a non-exponential 
discounting of future monetary flows, i.e., with a non-flat term structure of discount rates. 
To show this, consider the 3-period consumption-saving problem under certainty: 
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1 2
0 1 2
1 2
2
, , 0 1 2
2
0 1 2
max ( ) ( ) ( )
. . ,
c c c u c e u c e u c
s t c e c e c w
ρ ρ
δ δ
− −
− −
+ +
+ + =  
where ρt is the per-period rate of impatience associated to time-horizon t, δt is the interest 
rate at date 0 of a zero-coupon bond with maturity at date t, and w is the lifetime wealth of 
the agent. Exponential (utility) discounting holds only if ρ1=ρ2, and the term structure of 
(monetary) discount rates is flat if δ1=δ2.  The first-order conditions are written as 
 1 1 2 22 20 1 2'( ) '( ) '( ),u c e u c e u c
δ ρ δ ρλ − −= = =  (3) 
which yields a single optimal consumption plan * * *0 1 2( , , )c c c  when combined with the 
budget constraint. Observe also that equations (3) are equivalent to the pricing formula 
obtained when using the consumption-based approach in the certainty context. 
 Let time pass, and consider the decision problem of the same agent at date t=1. Is 
the remaining consumption plan * *1 2( , )c c  still optimal in the new context? The decision 
problem can now be written as 
1
1 2
1
, 1 2
ˆ *
1 2 1
max ( ) ( )
. . ( ),
c c u c e u c
s t c e c e w c
ρ
δδ
−
−
+
+ = −
 
where δˆ  is the short-term interest rate that prevails at date t=1. By a simple arbitrage 
argument, it can be checked that 2 1ˆ 2δ δ δ= − . The first-order conditions for this problem 
can be written as 
 1ˆ1 2ˆ '( ) '( ).u c e u c
δ ρλ −= =  (4) 
The two right equalities in (3) and (4) are compatible only if 1 1δ ρ−  equals 
2 2 1
ˆ2 2δ ρ δ ρ− − + , which is true only if 1ρ  equals 2ρ , that is, only if utility discounting is 
exponential. Whether the term structure of (monetary) discount rates is flat, decreasing or 
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increasing is irrelevant for the time consistency of individual and collective decisions. 
Agents are perfectly able to plan their future consumption levels with perfect foresight 
about the evolution of their expectations and of interest rates. On the contrary, the relative 
weight of utils at calendar date t and t+1 must remain constant through time in order to get 
time consistent decisions. 
 A similar point can be made in an uncertain environment. In such an environment, 
the optimal consumption plan is state-dependent. It is time consistent if agents do not want 
to revise these state-contingent plans when time passes, and when uncertainty is 
progressively resolved. As in the certainty case, it requires exponential discounting, but it 
is fully compatible with a non-flat term structure.  
 
3. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: THE EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF THE 
OPTIMAL TRAJECTORY OF DDR 
The discussion in Section 2 brings to light some interesting issues concerning the 
characterization of the future path of interest rates. In the consumption-based approach, it 
is mainly persistence of shocks on consumption growth that leads to decline in discount 
rates over time. Similarly, persistence on shocks on interest rates is the force that generates 
DDRs in the production-based approach. However, the existence of persistence is an 
empirical question. This section shows how we can empirically estimate a schedule of 
DDRs based on available historical data. Our objective is to calculate a sequence of an 
aggregate DDR required for the case study examined in Section 4. 
It should be clear by now that, in general, there are two different classes of models 
to describe the behavior of the term structure of the social discount rate. That is, structural 
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models where forward rates are determined by exogenous variables (e.g. growth of 
consumption) and univariate time series models where forward rates are determined by 
past rates. The choice between the two approaches is not straightforward, since they both 
have advantages and disadvantages.  
From a theoretical point of view, a structural model is able to represent the 
underlying economic relations and seems preferable to a simple univariate model. It is 
reasonable to believe that if the assumptions underlying a structural model are valid, it will 
produce better forecasts for the interest rate compared to a univariate model. 
However, from an empirical point of view, the theoretical advantage of a structural 
model over a univariate one can turn into a disadvantage if any of the assumptions of the 
structural model is violated. On the other hand, the main assumption behind the univariate 
model is that past behaviour of interest rates can reveal useful information about the future 
dynamics of the series. Moreover, in the context of structural models, we need long-term 
forecasts of all the variables that determine the interest rates in order to calculate the 
projected values of the interest rates. This can create estimation problems due to the 
possible time-variation of the parameters of the model. Furthermore, the researcher is 
obliged to perform the analysis based on the period where data for all variables of the 
structural model are available. This can result in the loss of important information. On the 
other hand, a univariate model requires data only for the interest rate and thus the analysis 
is usually extended to longer periods. It is reasonable to expect that when the objective is to 
derive a schedule of discount rates for, say, the next 400 years, a model that is based on 
150-200 years of data (i.e. information) will probably outperform a model that is based on, 
say, only 60-80 years of data. The data availability issue is very important in our case 
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where we try to calculate an aggregate DDR based on a number of country-specific 
estimates. 
 In summary, we believe that structural models are well-suited for short-term 
forecasts. However, their empirical implementation to describe the behaviour of the term 
structure in the distant future creates a number of problems described above. Therefore, we 
choose to describe the behavior of interest rates in the context of univariate time-series 
models. The utilization of a univariate model allows us to extend the estimation sample 
using long historical data that cover more than 200 years in some cases. This allows us to 
capture many historical events that affect the stochastic characteristics of the interest rate 
series. 
Our focus is on the determination of the stochastic nature of interest rates through 
the observed dynamics of the process. After a short description of the available dataset, we 
choose the optimal model to describe the real interest rate of the countries under scrutiny, 
that is, France, India, Japan and South Africa. We then generate a series of discount factors 
and DDRs for each country based on the simulation procedure introduced by Newel and 
Pizer (2003). In a similar manner, we also generate discount factors and DDRs for 
Australia, Canada, Germany, the UK and the US based on each country's optimal estimated 
model as suggested by Hepburn et al. (2008) for the first four countries and Groom et al. 
(2007) for the US.4 Afterwards, we construct the aggregate discount factor (and the 
                                                 
4In their simulation experiment, Hepburn et al. (2008) and Groom et al. (2007) set the initial value of the 
DDR equal to 3.5 and 4 percent, respectively. In this study, we set the initial value of the DDR equal to the 
sample mean. We therefore repeat the simulations for Australia, Canada, Germany, the UK and the US 
setting the initial value of the DDR equal to the sample mean in order to obtain a uniform set of results. 
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corresponding aggregate DDR) as a weighted average rate of the nine discount factors of 
the individual countries. 
 
3.1 Data 
 Social discount factors are prices of future consumption relative to consumption 
today. The relative price of future consumption could be calculated from the risk-free 
long-term interest rates. However, there are at least four arguments for the 
inappropriateness of simply using market prices: (a) market imperfections, (b) the 
super-responsibility of the government to both current and future generations, (c) the dual 
role of the members of the present generation in that in their political role they may be 
more concerned about future generations than their day-to-day activities on current 
markets would reveal, and (d) Sen's (1982) argument that individuals may be willing to 
join in a collective savings contract, even though they are unwilling to save as much in 
isolation. Although some of these positions generated heated argument, the overall view 
emerged that the real risk-free market interest rates provide an inappropriate conceptual 
basis for social discounting. However, the alternative of using the shadow price on capital 
in order to convert the magnitude of future effects to their consumption equivalents, is not 
currently used by policy makers, reflecting a mix of practicability and the view that the real 
risk-free interest rate and the shadow discount rate are quite close in magnitude 
(Spackman, 1991; Arrow, 1995; Pearce and Ulph, 1999). Based on these results, we use 
data on market interest rates for our empirical estimation. 
We consider the real interest rate for France, India, Japan and South Africa. In an 
attempt to use the longest possible interest rate series, we choose the 10-year Government 
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Bond Yield for France, the 7- and 20-year Government Bond Yields for Japan and South 
Africa respectively and the Government Bond Yield for India (as constructed by Global 
Financial Data). All interest rates are in domestic currency. Table 1 provided more 
information about the available sample and the series under scrutiny. We first calculate the 
real interest rate by subtracting the inflation rate (calculated based on the Consumer Price 
Index). Similarly to Newel and Pizer (2003), we assume that the inflation rate is zero 
before 1950. In order to preclude negative real interest rates from the analysis, we remove 
the effect of short periods of unusually high inflation (e.g. during the oil crisis in the mid 
'70s) using a simple dummy variable regression to subtract the extra level of inflation 
observed during that periods. This approach is followed for all countries except India. In 
the case of India, inflation is very high and volatile during the last 20 years, reaching 90 
percent in some cases. Therefore, in the case of India and for the post-1973 period, we set 
the inflation rate equal to the average inflation rate during the pre-1973 period. In all cases, 
we consider a 4-year moving average real interest rate to smooth any short-term 
fluctuations. We then convert the real interest rate series to their continuously compounded 
equivalents. Finally, the estimation is based on the natural logarithm of the series to ensure 
that the simulated DDRs are positive. We should note that negative discount rates are 
unusual but not inconceivable. We choose to preclude negative discount rates for two 
reasons. First, we want to be consistent with previous studies, such as Groom et al. (2007), 
since we use some of their estimation results in our analysis. Second, we believe that 
negative rates are unlikely to persist for long periods. 
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The basic descriptive statistics of the transformed series used in the estimation 
procedure are reported in Table 2. The French rate has the higher mean, while the Japanese 
rate is the more volatile one. 
Table 1 here 
Table 2 here 
 
3.2 Country-specific DDRs 
 The aim of this section is to describe the statistical properties of the time path of the 
interest rates. There are numerous studies in the literature which argue that interest rates are 
subject to infrequent but important changes in the mean and the variance. The sources of 
these structural changes are not clear but are probably related to either monetary or fiscal 
policy. Moreover, the poor performance of various models (such as the Cox et al. (1985) 
model) in empirical studies to describe the yield curve may be attributed to the fact that 
they do not account for structural changes in the behavior of the interest rate. It is therefore 
important to choose a model for the interest rate that takes into account the existence of 
such structural changes, which is an important characteristic of the series. As a result, many 
researchers have chosen regime-switching models to describe either a single time series of 
an interest rate (e.g. Hamilton 1988 and Gray 1996) or the entire term structure of interest 
rates (e.g. Bansal and Zhou, 2001). We follow a similar procedure and choose a 
two-regime model to describe each interest rate series. Each one of the two regimes has a 
different mean as well as a different variance. The level of persistence of the process under 
each regime is also different. Finally, our specification allows for different lag order 
specification between regimes and countries. In summary, our parameterization describes a 
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process that incurs a number of regime shifts over time where each regime has a different 
mean, variance and persistence. We can also estimate the average time that the process 
spends in each regime, which also determines the frequency of regime switches. Although 
we are not certain about the regime of the process in each point in time, we can easily 
estimate the probability of being in each regime over the sample period. The estimation 
results and the model selection procedure are described in more detail in Appendix A.  
We then implement a simulation methodology to generate a series of discount 
factors (and the corresponding discount rates) for each country under examination. The 
simulation uses each estimated model to simulate 200.000 possible future paths of the 
interest rate. The simulation is structured so that it takes into account two different sources 
of uncertainty that characterize the estimated model. First, the simulation considers the 
typical uncertainty found in all stochastic models stemming from the stochastic nature of 
the error term. In other words, random draws of the error terms are generated for each 
simulated path. Second, the simulation accounts for the uncertainty that surrounds the 
point estimates of the parameters of the regime-switching model. Specifically, each 
simulated path of the discount rate uses a random draw for all the parameters of the model 
based on the point estimates and the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the 
parameters. The utilization of a two-regime model instead of a single-regime one allows 
for the possibility of regime switches in the future. In other words, irrespectively of the 
regime of the process during the recent years, the Regime-Switching (RS) model (and the 
simulation exercise) considers the possibility that the process incurs a number of regime 
changes in the future. This is crucial since we know that the calculated DDR depends on 
the level of uncertainty and thus the estimated model used in the simulation should be able 
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to provide a relative good approximation of the actual uncertainty that surrounds the 
behavior of the discount rates. For each simulated series, we set the initial values equal to 
the sample mean of the real interest rate.5 One can reasonably argue that the long-period 
average is not an appropriate initial value for the simulation exercise, since it generates an 
initial value of the real interest rates that is higher than the real interest rates observed 
during the recent years in some developed countries. In order to examine the sensitivity of 
our results to the choice of the initial value in the simulations, at a later stage of our analysis 
we repeat the simulations setting the initial rate equal to 3.5 percent (that is, the rate 
currently used by HM Treasury for the evaluation of long-term projects). For the moment, 
we focus on estimated discount factors for the case where the initial values equal the 
sample mean of the series under examination. 
The estimated discount factors and discount rates are reported in the first part of 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively. In general, we observe significant differences in the discount 
rates. France seems to produce the sharpest declining rate. Although the French one-period 
ahead rate is substantially higher than that of the other three countries, its terminal value 
(1.064 percent) is close to that of the Indian rate (0.858 percent) and lower than the 
terminal rates of Japan and South Africa (1.39 and 2.358 percent respectively). On the 
other hand, the interest rate of South Africa declines very slowly, by only 1.5 percent in 
400 years. The differences between the speed of decline in the country-specific discount 
rates mainly stems from the level of persistence of the individual series. The theoretical 
results presented in Section 2 show that (in an uncertain environment) it is persistence that 
leads to DDRs. The level of persistence determines the speed of decline in the forward 
                                                 
5See Groom et al. (2007) for further details about the design of the simulations. 
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discount rates. In our case, the French interest rate is the more persistent one and thus it 
produces the sharpest DDR. On the other hand, the South-African interest rate is much less 
persistent than the other three rates under scrutiny, resulting in a slowly declining forward 
discount rate. 
Table 3 here 
Table 4 here 
Tables 3 and 4 also report the estimated discount factors and rates for Australia, 
Canada, Germany, the UK and the US based on each country's estimated model as 
suggested by Hepburn et al. (2008) for the first four countries and Groom et al. (2007) for 
the US. We repeated the simulations of the two aforementioned studies by using a different 
initial value for the simulations. Specifically, we set the initial value equal to the sample 
mean. By doing so, we end up with a uniform set of nine DDRs.6 
 
3.3 Aggregation of the Discount Factors 
Environmental degradation is one of the most important issues that affect the globe. 
Growing international environmental interdependence and increased environmental 
awareness over the past years led to multilateral efforts to promote international policies 
and projects to mitigate problems like global warming and air pollution. The evaluation of 
such multinational projects requires the calculation of a proper “global” discount rate. We 
now try to compose such a discount rate. Specifically, we use the nine discount factor 
series calculated above to construct a weighted average discount factor profile (and the 
corresponding DDR profile) that can be used in cost-benefit analysis of long-term projects 
                                                 
6We should note that contrary to our sample that extends up to 2006, the estimation sample used by Hepburn 
et al. (2008) for Australia, Canada, Germany and the UK ends in 2004. Moreover, the estimation sample of 
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that affect the global environment and economy. On the other hand, when evaluating 
projects that affect a single country, the cost-benefit analysis should be based on the 
country-specific discount factors (like the ones reported in Table 3 of our study). We 
believe that the aggregate discount factor profile is useful (and probably better than the 
discount factors of any individual country) when evaluating projects that have a global 
effect (e.g. climate change). The use of this aggregate interest rate is based on the 
anticipation of a better international cooperation to harmonise policies relating to the 
challenges raised by global changes to our planet.7  
We consider three alternative weighting schemes in aggregating the 
country-specific discount factors. The first weighting scheme is based on the GDP of each 
country measured in Purchasing Power Parity terms. Specifically, the weight for each 
country equals the ratio of its GDP over the sum of the GDP of all nine countries under 
consideration. The second weighting scheme is based on annual CO2 emissions, that is, the 
weight of each country equals the ratio of its annual CO2 emissions over the total annual 
CO2 emissions of all nine countries of our sample. The third weighting scheme is based on 
the population size of each country in 2005, that is, each country’s weight equals the ratio 
of its population over the total population of all nine countries under examination. 
Obviously, the first weighting scheme is more meaningful than the other two from an 
economic point of view. On the other hand, we consider the three weighting scheme to be 
meaningful in environmental terms and thus our analysis is based on all three alternative 
weights for comparison reasons. Interestingly, the GDP and CO2 weights are similar 
                                                                                                                                                 
Groom et al. (2007) for the US ends in 1999. 
7 We calculate the aggregate DDR based on a sample of only nine countries. Obviously, we would have been 
able to estimate a “better” DDR (i.e. more representative of the global DDR) if additional large countries (e.g. 
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resulting in similar aggregate discount factors and aggregate DDRs. Therefore, for brevity, 
the rest of the discussion is limited to the discount factors and DDRs calculated based on 
either the GDP or population weighting schemes.8 The two alternative weighting schemes 
are reported in Table 5. We should also note that the nine countries under examination 
correspond to about 46.8 percent of the world's GDP and about 28.34 percent of the world's 
population. 
Table 5 here 
 The weighted average DDRs for the two alternative weighting schemes, presented 
in Table 6, have some differences but are in general close to each other. In general, the 
population-based aggregate rate is higher than the GDP-based aggregate rate for the first 
300 years, becoming lower than the GDP-based aggregate rate for the last 100 years of the 
simulation. As a result, the terminal rate of the population-based aggregate rate is about 1.1 
percent, that is, approximately 0.28 percent lower than that of the terminal GDP-based 
aggregate rate (which is about 1.38 percent). 
Table 6 here 
The results presented in Section 4 show that the two alternative weighting schemes 
generate quite similar valuations of climate change damages. In any case, we consider the 
GDP-based aggregate rate more reliable than the population-based aggregate rates for at 
least three reasons. First, GDP weights make more sense from an economic point of view. 
This is why the majority of empirical studies that compose an aggregate interest rate use 
weights based on GDP and the European Central Bank (ECB) calculates aggregate 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brazil, China and the Russian Federation) had been included in the analysis. Unfortunately, there are no 
reliable long historical data of interest rates series available for any of these countries. 
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measures for the EU based on each member’s GDP weight. Second, the nine countries 
under scrutiny account for about 46.8 percent of the world's GDP and about 28.34 percent 
of the world's population. Thus, the GDP-based aggregate rate seems to be more 
representative of the global DDR than the population-based aggregate rate.9 Third, in the 
context of our study, the behaviour of the population-based aggregate rate is mostly 
defined by the dynamics of the Indian rate, since the population-based weight for India is 
above 60 percent. 
 
4. DISCOUNTING CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGES 
 There are many uncertainties when it comes to the climate. There are uncertainties 
related to cloud formation, feedback from methane in melting permafrost and ecosystem 
responses to rapid change, to mention just a few. Hence it may come as a surprise to some 
non-economists that the main source of uncertainty in estimates of the economic 
consequences of climate change is something else: the discount rate. In fact, much of the 
critique of the Stern Review has focused not on the climate science embodied in the report 
or its assessment of the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation, but on the low 
discount rate used in the analysis and how this drives the central results of the Review (see 
e.g., Dasgupta (2006), Yohe (2006), Nordhaus (2007), Weitzman (2007a)). In this section, 
we investigate the policy implications of applying the two weighted average discount 
factors (and the corresponding DDRs) calculated in the previous section, on the 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 We also used an alternative weighting scheme, which is based on the projected population of each country 
in 2050. As expected, the results of this weighting scheme were similar to those based on each country’s 
population in 2005 and are not reported for brevity. 
9 The fact that the aggregate DDR calculated based on the CO2-emissions weights (not reported for brevity) 
produces similar results to the GDP-based DDR reinforces our belief that the GDP-based DDR seems to be a 
better approximation to the “global DDR”.  
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cost-benefit evaluation of the carbon mitigation policies and the conclusions of the Stern 
report.  
 
4.1 The Discount Rate in the Stern Review 
 The Stern Review contains a very careful and nuanced discussion of the discount 
issue (Stern, 2006, chapter 2). Under the assumption of a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) utility function for consumption, the choice of the discount rate in the 
Review is based on the Ramsey equation ( gδ ρ μ= + ) where δ  is the discount rate, μ  is 
the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, g is the growth rate of consumption 
(which is time varying) and ρ  is the pure time discount rate or the rate of time preference.  
Since the growth rate is eventually depressed by climate change, the consumption discount 
rate falls through time. Moreover, because a small number of Monte Carlo draws simulate 
severe damages and therefore low growth, the certainty-equivalent falls towards the 
trajectory of the lowest rate (highest damages). This should be analogous to what happens 
in a schedule of time-declining discount rates based on past, exogenous volatility in 
growth.  
However, the Review assumes that the elasticity of marginal utility is 1μ = , 
implying that the utility function is logarithmic. To accommodate for the fact that future 
generations will be richer, the growth effect to the discount rate is accounted for by 
assuming that the average annual rate of growth of consumption is 1.3% (Review, Box 6.3). 
Moreover, the Review argues that on ethical grounds the welfare of future generations 
should be treated at par with the welfare of the present generation, a position that implies 
the selection of a zero pure time discount rate. However, the Review also claims that 
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uncertainty for the existence of the human race suggests that a positive rate should be 
selected instead (Review, Technical Annex to Postscript). Thus, the pure time discount rate 
is set at 0.1%, meaning that the survival probability of the human race for 100 years is 0.91. 
The Review acknowledges that there exist justifications for using higher pure time 
discount rates that suggest that pure time discount rate can be thought of as covering the 
possibility of reversing a particular investment. However these justifications are invalid in 
the case of climate change cost evaluation since “climate change is long-term, severe and 
irreversible”. This is the reason why the justification that technological or other advances 
may mitigate climate change in the future, is not employed. In addition, it is supposed that 
future generations would willingly exchange conventional capital stock with improved 
environmental conditions in the future. As a result, the overall discount rate that is derived 
from the average growth of 1.3% is 1.4%, which is an unusually low value! 
This low discount rate is entirely consistent with the Ramsey rule, but it crucially 
depends on the chosen values for the structural parameters. If a researcher chooses a 
different value for any of these parameters, the calculated discount rate will be 
substantially different than 1.4 percent and as a result the CBA will probably lead to 
different conclusions. For example, with μ=2, the socially efficient discount rate would be 
2.7 percent. The discounting approach used in the Review and the chosen values for the 
structural parameters has been the subject of much controversy and criticism (see, for 
example, Dasgupta, 2006; Nordhaus, 2007).  
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4.2 The Social Cost of Carbon 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is the shadow price of anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide emissions. The SCC is defined as the present value of the stream of damages from 
one ton of carbon. In this section the results of the two weighted average DDRs calculated 
in the previous section are applied to the calculation of the SCC. The SCC for each of the 
weighted discounting profiles is calculated based on the baseline damages scenario of the 
FUND 2.8 integrated assessment model, which reports the projected cost of emissions in $ 
per ton of carbon emissions (Tol 2002a, 2002b). This model estimates the impacts of 
climate change to a wide variety of market and non market sectors like agriculture, forestry, 
sea-level rise, ecosystems, fatal vector-borne diseases, and fatal cardiovascular and 
respiratory disorders. The results represent the aggregation of the effects of climate change 
in 9 different regions: OECD-America (excl. Mexico), OECD-Europe, OECD-Pacific 
(excl. South Korea), Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Middle 
East, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, Centrally Planned Asia, and Africa. The 
parameters used in the analysis are derived from the relevant literature. The results indicate 
that climate change will have different implications according to the region and the sector 
examined. 
In Panel A of Table 7 we present the implied SCC using the GDP and 2005 
population weighted profiles. In addition to the SCC calculated based on the estimated 
average discount factors (second column of Table 7 labeled “Average”), we also report 
lower and upper bounds for the SCC. More in detail, the lower bound corresponds to the 
SCC calculated based on the lower 2.5 percent quantile of the simulated distribution of the 
discount factors, while the upper bound corresponds to the SCC calculated based on the 
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upper 97.5 percent quantile of the simulated distribution of the discount factors.10 Table 7 
also reports the social cost of carbon under a constant discounting regime of 1.4% per year 
approximating the one implemented in the Stern Review. As a measure of comparison, the 
US Environmental Protection Agency estimates that the average 2-person household in the 
US produces approximately 20 tons of CO2 annually.11 
Table 7 here 
The social cost of carbon under GDP weighting is 12.60$/tonC. When using population 
weighting, the overall social cost of carbon decreases by 29.76% to 8.85$/tonC. Under the 
constant 1.4% rate, the social cost of carbon is 40.15$/tonC. These results are indicative of 
the significance of discounting assumptions to the long-term valuation of climate change. 
Using a low albeit constant discount rate (1.4%) increases the valuation of social benefits 
from CO2 abatement from 3.18 to 4.5 times than under declining discounting patterns. We 
now turn to the estimated 95 percent confidence intervals for the SCC that reveal the 
uncertainty that surrounds the calculated SCC. Specifically, under a scenario of high 
discount rates, the calculated SCC is as low as 3.09$/tonC and 2.48$/tonC for the GDP 
weighted and population weighted discount factors respectively. On the other hand, under 
a low discount rate scenario, the SCC increases to 23.69$/tonC and 17.99$/tonC for the 
GDP weighted and population weighted discount factors respectively. We should note 
however that in all cases the calculated SCC under the DDRs is substantially lower than 
that under the 1.4 percent constant discount rate.  
As mentioned earlier in this study, it is interesting to examine the sensitivity of our 
results to the choice of the initial value in the simulation exercise that estimates the 
                                                 
10 Due to computational limitations, we use 50.000 replications to obtain the upper and lower bounds. 
11 http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ind_calculator.html. 
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discount factors and rates. Therefore, we repeat the simulations setting the initial rate equal 
to 3.5 percent.12 Panel B of Table 7, reports the SCC estimated from GDP and Population 
weighted discount profiles given a 3.5 percent initial rate. The implied results are slightly 
higher compared to the original weighted discount schemes but still substantially lower 
compared to the constant 1.4% rate. We, thus, observe that setting a different initial value 
in the simulation exercise results in similar estimated SCC. 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of benefits from a reduction of one ton in CO2 
emissions over time for the GDP, population, GDP and Population with a 3.5% initial 
value weighted schemes as well as for the 1.4% constant discount rates.  
Figure 1 here 
Figure 1 reveals that the majority of the benefits from reducing emissions by one 
ton of CO2 under both weighting schemes are accumulated until the year 2200. Between 
the year 2200 and 2400 the discounted benefits are of substantially smaller magnitude. 
Benefits under the two weighting profiles are consistently lower when compared to the 
constant 1.4% discounting profile. The benefits under GDP weighting are higher compared 
to the population weighting for the first 300 years, while this is reversed for the final 100 
years. The utilization of a lower initial value of 3.5 percent has a minor effect on the 
evolution of benefits. The oscillating pattern in the lines of Figure 1 is caused by the nature 
of the damages assumed by the FUND 2.8 model. Specifically, damages from one ton of 
CO2 are assumed to remain constant across decades while the discounting profile is a 
yearly time series. Furthermore, the cost of carbon is greater in the short- and medium-term, 
but fall as carbon becomes sequestrated in the medium-term, thus generating the hump 
                                                 
12 We should note that in cases where the mean value of the series (as suggested by the estimated model) is 
higher than 3.5 percent, setting the initial value to 3.5 percent results in a forward discount rate that initially 
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shape. In Table 8 we display the present value of the benefits from reducing emissions by 
one ton at selected years while in Table 9 we report the marginal contribution to the present 
value at these years. Both tables illustrate that the contribution to aggregate benefits 
significantly flattens out after 150 years for both declining discount rate weights. On the 
other hand, benefits from abatement under constant 1.4% discounting exhibit similar 
noticeable flattening only after the 250th year.  
Table 8 here  
Table 9 here 
In Table 10 we report the estimated average social cost of carbon and its 95 percent 
confidence interval for each one of the nine countries under consideration. North American 
countries exhibit the highest SCC, since for the US and Canada the estimated values are 
18.39$/tonC (3.90$/tonC, 31.55$/tonC) and 11.65$/tonC (1.08$/tonC, 30.23$/tonC) 
respectively. Australia has the next highest average SCC with 11.45$/tonC (4.92$/tonC, 
20.96$/tonC). The two major European industrial countries represented in the sample the 
UK and Germany cluster next with 9.40$/tonC (4.43$/tonC, 16.54$/tonC) and 8.67$/tonC 
(1.88$/tonC, 19.89$/tonC) respectively. For Japan the SCC is 8.45$/tonC (2.69$/tonC, 
17.39$/tonC) and for South Africa with 7.95$/tonC (3.07$/tonC, 16.05$/tonC). France and 
India display roughly average identical SCC with 6.35$/tonC (1.35$/tonC, 16.18$/tonC) 
and 6.46$/tonC (2.05$/tonC, 14.11$/tonC) respectively. It is worth noting the disparity 
between the implied SCC among countries that is suggested from the different discount 
rates applied. Indicatively, the implied SCC for the US is approximately three times the 
one for France and India.  
Table 10 here 
                                                                                                                                                 
increases for a short period (moving up towards the mean) before starting its declining movement.  
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Figure 2 graphically illustrates the evolution of benefits from abatement through 
time for each of the countries in the sample. For all countries in the sample except the US, 
contributions fall significantly after the 150th year. For example, the marginal contributions 
are close to zero for South Africa, Japan, Germany and the UK after the 200th year. Counter 
to this, the marginal benefits for the US remain noticeable until the 250th year. 
Figure 2 here 
 
4.3 Using the Baseline + Market Impact + Non-market Impact Damages Scenario of 
the Stern Review 
Our purpose is to compare the implications on the monetary valuation of the 
damages from climate change from the two different models (FUND 2.8 and PAGE2002) 
under different discounting regimes. In this section, we present the results implied from the 
baseline + market + non market damages from the Stern Review.  The baseline scenario in 
the Stern Review is designed to be consistent with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) third assessment report and assumes a mean warming of 3.9oC relative to 
pre-industrial levels by 2100. The IPCC’s third assessment report estimates a mean 
temperature increase ranging from 1.5oC to 4.5oC. 
The damages are estimated using the integrated assessment model employed by the 
Review that combines scientific models of climate change and economic modelling of the 
effects of climate change. As stated in the text the assumption of the Review is that climate 
change depresses the growth rate. According to the Stern Review, the primary sources of 
emissions in the future will be today’s developing nations and China is expected to account 
for one third of the increase. The Review reports evidence that economic growth has lead 
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to decarbonisation of the rich developed economies through changes in the production 
process, demand patterns and institutional changes. Nevertheless, it implies that we cannot 
rely on this effect for facing climate change and policies limiting CO2 emissions are 
required. Under a Business as Usual Scenario, CO2 emissions will continue to increase. 
According to the simulations in the Review the largest component of CO2 emissions will 
be a by-product of energy production. To break down CO2 emissions from energy 
production to its constituent parts the Review employs the Kave identity according to 
which: 
CO2 emissions from energy=Population*GPD per Head*(Energy Use/GDP)* 
(CO2 emissions/Energy Use) 
Hence, an increase in global GDP is expected to increase emissions from energy unless 
there are offsetting effects from the emissions intensity of energy use or the energy 
intensity of GDP. 
Damages from climate change as illustrated in the Stern Review are significantly 
different in their format compared to those reported from the FUND 2.8 model. Damages 
in the former are reported as monetary and percentage losses in per capita GDP relative to 
the per capita GDP in the state of the world under no climate change. Since the Review 
does not describe how the social cost of carbon is calculated and since it reports no series of 
projected emissions it is not possible to calculate the SCC in this case. However, we can 
derive the implications of the two discount factor weighting schemes to the overall 
damages from climate change reported by the Review, as well as the implications for the 
welfare of individual countries in the sample. 
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In order to be consistent with the previous section and in line with the estimated 
discounting profiles we assume that all present values are reported as of 2005 for damages 
occurring from 2006 onwards. Contrary to the Stern Review, in the calculations, we 
assume that the horizon is 400 years instead of 200 years to account for the full length of 
the discounting profile. Since the damages are reported in intervals, we assume that for 
years within those intervals the decrease in GDP is equal to the damage for the interval. 
The damages between the 200th and 400th year are assumed to be equal to those of the 200th 
year while damages after the 400th year are ignored.  
In Table 11 we report the present value of damages from climate change using 
different discounting profiles (that is GDP weighting, Population weighting, constant 1.4 
percent, as well as GDP and Population weighting based on a 3.5 percent initial value). 
Damages from climate change are defined as the difference between the projected GDP per 
capita under no climate change and under the baseline scenario in the Stern Review. The 
results indicate that the present value of damages under the GDP weighting is 
approximately twice the present value of damages under population weighting. 
Specifically, over the 400 year horizon the average present value of damages per capita in 
the baseline scenario is $10505.61 under GDP weighting while it is $5056.85 under 
population weighting. Damages under the constant 1.4% regime greatly exceed the 
declining rate regimes with the resulting present value being $76099. Given that the 
estimate specified by the Stern Review for the mean per capita income in 2001 is $7240, 
the present value of the damages calculated for the GDP weighting, population weighting 
and the constant 1.4% profile are 1.45, 0.69 and 10.5 times the 2001 mean per capita 
income respectively. Using an initial rate of 3.5% in the simulation exercise to estimate the 
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GDP and Population weighted discount profiles produces slightly higher damage estimates 
compared to the original ones: the PV is 10832.79 and 5382.90 respectively.  
Table 11 here 
 To evaluate the dynamic evolution of damages, we calculate the aggregate present 
value of the difference between the no climate change scenario and the baseline scenario 
for each year, under all the discount profiles. The results are reported in Table 12. It is 
worth noting that for all discounting profiles, more than half of the value of per capita 
damages from climate change, arises during the time period between years 200 to 400, 
which is not accounted for in the Stern Review. This effect is greater for the 
population-weighted discounting profile. Adopting a 200 year horizon suggests that the 
present value of damages for the GDP, the Population and the constant 1.4% profiles are 
$5559, $3014 and $29798, respectively. Furthermore, when using a 3.5 percent as an initial 
value in the simulations, the relevant values for the GDP and Population weighted profiles 
are $5762 and $3242 respectively. The evolution of the present value of damages over time 
is also visualized in Figure 3. It is evident that the two alternative GDP-based discount 
profiles (i.e. one calculated using the sample mean as an initial value and one calculated 
using a 3.5 percent as an initial value) generate almost identical damages. The same holds 
for the two alternative population-based discount profiles. 
Table 12 here  
Figure 3 here 
 As illustrated in Tables 11, 12 and Figure 3, the choice of the discounting profile 
has significant impacts on the valuation of damages borne by climate change over the 
specified 400 year horizon. Adopting either of the two weighted declining discounting 
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profiles, results to substantially lower estimates of climate change damages compared to 
the ones derived in the Stern Review. This is attributed, to a large extent, to the small value 
of the pure time discount rate that is assumed in the Review, in order to accommodate 
damages across generations in an egalitarian fashion. Nevertheless, a declining discount 
profile can correct the insufficient representation of future generations, but at the same 
time better maintain that current generations discount the future.  
 The analysis also reveals that the calculated valuations of climate change damages 
from the two alternative weighted discount profiles are of the same magnitude. However, 
we observe that the GDP-based DDR produces slightly higher valuation of climate change 
damages compared to the population-based DDR. This stems from the fact that the two 
weighting schemes (and as a result the corresponding DDRs) are not similar with respect to 
their ability to ‘represent’ the ‘global situation’. In terms of GDP, our sample represents 
about 46.8 percent of the world's GDP. On the other hand, our sample represents only 
28.34 percent of the world's population. As a result, the GDP-based DDR is clearly a better 
approximation to the ‘global DDR’. We believe that the two aggregate DDRs would 
become similar to each other if it was feasible to include additional large countries in the 
analysis. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our main point in this paper is that when uncertainty is taken into account, the case for the 
use of Declining Discount Rates (DDRs) in long-run cost-benefit analyses becomes 
compelling. The decision to replace constant discount rates with DDRs has serious policy 
implications. In fact, such a decision implies that the policy maker will put relatively more 
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effort to improve social welfare in the far distant future than in the shorter time. In this 
paper we emphasize that the relative value of this effort cannot be decided arbitrarily. A 
theory-consistent and empirically reliable estimation method is needed. To develop this 
method, we assume a declining, but time-stable structure of discount rates, and connect the 
representative-individual intergenerational theory with the empirical treatment of 
country-specific historical data. The application of our method gives empirical estimates of 
DDRs schedule. This estimated schedule is used for the calculation of a sequence of 
aggregate (‘global’) DDR schedule, which is used for the CBA of climate change 
mitigation policies. Our results add to the ‘discount rate-related’ criticism of the Stern 
Review, that is, the results of the Review are driven by an arbitrarily low constant discount 
rate. In conclusion, we claim that a DDR profile, if correctly estimated, can correct the 
insufficient representation of future generations, but at the same time better maintain that 
current generations discount the future.  
 One of the most important contributions of this paper is that it proposes how the 
theory consistent optimal long-run trajectory of the decline in discount rates can be 
efficiently estimated, without the use of a structural model. We believe that structural 
models are well-suited for short-term forecasts. However, their empirical implementation 
to describe the behaviour of the term structure of the interest rate in the distant future 
creates a number of problems, which we have discussed in section 3. Our alternative 
approach describes interest rates by means of a simple univariate time series model and is 
based on the assumption that the past behavior of interest rates can reveal useful 
information about the future dynamics of the series. Our model describes the uncertainty in 
the behavior of interest rates. This uncertainty together with persistence of the interest rates 
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leads to DDRs. The utilization of a univariate model allows us to extend the estimation 
sample using long historical data that cover more than 200 years in some cases. This allows 
us to capture many historical events that affect the stochastic characteristics of the interest 
rate series for the nine ‘representative’ countries we study. In particular, we use 
regime-switching models to describe the stochastic dynamics of the real interest rate and 
derive a schedule of DDR for each country under scrutiny. 
 We then compose two alternative weighted declining discounting profiles that can 
be used in cost-benefit analyses of ‘global’ projects: the GDP-based DDR and the 
population-based DDR. These two profiles are applied on the cost-benefit evaluation of 
carbon mitigation policies and the conclusions of the Stern Report. We believe that this is a 
very timely exercise, given that much of the critique of the Review has focused on the low 
discount rate used in the analysis and how this drives the central results. Adopting either of 
the two weighted declining discounting profiles, results to substantially lower estimates of 
climate change damages compared to the ones derived in the Stern Review. This is 
attributed, to a large extent, to the small value of the pure time discount rate that is assumed 
in the Review, in order to accommodate damages across generations in an egalitarian 
fashion. Our declining discount profiles correct the insufficient representation of future 
generations, but at the same time better maintain that current generations discount the 
future. We should note however that the estimated confidence intervals for the valuation of 
carbon mitigation policies reveal the uncertainty that surrounds the calculated net present 
values of climate change damages in cases where the (unknown) future discount rates are 
very low or high. 
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In closing this paper we want to briefly mention possible future research directions. 
Our methodology for the estimation of country-specific DDRs and the calculation of an 
aggregate DDR is based on univariate specifications for the interest rates. Thus, our 
empirical approach ignores the future stochastic consumption-growth process. The 
theoretical work of Gollier (2007) and Weitzman (2007b) provides a promising route for 
future investigation where consumption growth (and especially consumption growth-rate 
volatility) and people’s preferences enter the analysis for the calculation of a DDR.  
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APPENDIX A: Estimations and Model Selection 
We first estimate an Autoregressive model of order p (AR(p)) for each series under 
examination. Specifically, the estimated model is:  
titi
i
p
ttt eaeer ξη +=+= −
=
∑
1
,  (A1) 
where ),0( 2σξ Nt ∼ . The estimation results are reported in Table T1. Throughout this 
study, the lag order selection is based on the Hannan-Quinn Information criterion.13 The 
constant parameter AR model given in (A1) is probably unable to describe the dynamics of 
the interest rate series over a long period, since the existence of various economic crises 
alters the behavior of the interest rates. A simple estimation of the autoregressive 
parameters of the AR model for each country based on a rolling estimation sample of 60 
observations, not reported for brevity, reveal that the estimated parameters are not constant 
over time. This is a clear indication that the estimates of the AR models are not reliable. 
Table T1: 
Estimated AR Models 
 France India Japan S. Africa 
1.393 1.432 1.298 1.273 η (0.199) (0.295) (0.291) (0.223) 
1.217 1.353 0.898 1.103 α1 (0.022) (0.038) (0.044) (0.044) 
-0.483 -0.259 α2 --- (0.051) --- (0.051) 
-0.440 α3 (0.033) --- --- --- 
-0.178 α4 --- (0.048) --- --- 
0.171 0.257 α5 (0.023) (0.040) --- --- 
0.019 0.014 0.054 0.041 σ2 (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
                                                 
13In almost all cases, the Akaike and Schwartz Information Criteria select the same model. 
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 In the literature, there are various efforts to produce time-dependent models for the 
interest rate, i.e. models with time-varying parameters.14 Since the seminal works of 
Hamilton (1988, 1989), regime-switching (RS) models became a very popular class of 
models to describe the time-variation in the dynamics of interest rates. In this study, we 
consider the following two-regime model:  
tit
k
i
i
p
ttkt eaeer ξη +=+= −
=
∑
1
,  (A2) 
where ),,0( 2kt N σξ ∼  2,1=k  for the first and second regime respectively. We allow the 
two regimes to have different lag order. This model allows the interest rate to have 
different behavior in different periods by moving from one regime to the other. In regards 
to the probability law governing the transition from the first regime to the second regime 
and vice versa, we assume the simplest case of a Markov 1 chain, that is  
ijttttttt pisjsrrgsisjs ======= −−−−− )|(Pr,...),,...,,|(Pr 12121  (A3) 
where 2,1, =ji . In other words, the probability of being in regime j at time t ( jst = ) 
depends on only the most recent regime ( 1−ts ).  
The estimation results, reported in Table T2, show that the first regime corresponds 
to periods of low real interest rates and high volatility, while the second regime 
corresponds to periods of high real interest rates and low volatility. In all cases both 
regimes are persistent as indicated by the estimated transition probabilities which are 
always above 90 percent. In other words, the estimation results suggest that we do not 
observe many regime switches during the period under scrutiny. This is illustrated in 
                                                 
14See, inter alia, Ho and Lee (1986), Black et al. (1990), Hull and White (1990) and Black and Karasinski 
(1991). 
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Figure F1 that presents the ex-post smoothed probability of being in the first regime, i.e. 
)|1Pr(,1 ttt sp Ω==  where tΩ  is the information set available at time t, for each one of the 
estimated models. 
Table T2: 
Estimated Regime-Switching Models 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
  
 France India Japan S. Africa 
 Regime 1 
1.179 1.091 0.989 1.194 η1 (0.411) (0.225) (0.244) (0.282) 
1.300 1.219 0.563 0.754 α11 (0.105) (0.172) (0.135) (0.044) 
-0.393 -0.486 0.478 α21 (0.131) (0.177) (0.193) --- 
α31 --- --- --- --- 
-0.311 α41 --- --- (0.148) --- 
α51 --- --- --- --- 
0.072 0.064 0.110 0.098 σ21 (0.008) (0.012) (0.024) (0.012) 
 Regime 2 
1.484 1.565 1.133 1.395 η2 (0.168) (0.174) (0.490) (0.049) 
1.623 1.729 1.392 1.781 α12 (0.053) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) 
-0.378 -0.741 -0.367 -0.834 α22 (0.106) (0.039) (0.050) (0.045) 
-0.439 α32 (0.080) --- --- --- 
-0.147 α42 --- --- (0.066) --- 
0.178 0.110 α52 (0.028) --- (0.035) --- 
0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.0005 σ22 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Transition Probabilities 
0.942 0.947 0.924 0.978 p11 (0.029) (0.047) (0.040) (0.018) 
0.974 0.981 0.949 0.976 p22 (0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.020) 
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Figure F1: 
Smoothed Probability of the First Regime 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
50 100 150 200 250
FRANCE
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
INDIA
 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
25 50 75 100 125
JAPAN
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
25 50 75 100 125
SOUTH_AFRICA
 
 The rolling estimation of the simple AR models showed that the AR parameters are 
unstable revealing a time-variation in the dynamics of the real interest rates. We tried to 
capture this time-dependence of the series under examination by estimating a 
regime-switching model. An informal way to evaluate whether RS is an adequate 
representation of the data is to calculate the Regime Classification Measure (RCM) 
proposed by Ang and Bekaert (2002). In the case of a model with two regimes, RCM is 
based on tp ,1 . Specifically,  
)1(1400 ,1,1
1
tt
T
t
pp
T
RCM −∗= ∑
=
 (A4) 
where T is the sample size. By construction, RCM ranges between 0 and 100. The idea 
behind RCM is that the regime-switching model is good if we are able to classify regimes 
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sharply. In the extreme case where we are certain about the regime, i.e. 0,1 =tp  or 1 for 
every t, RCM equals zero. In the other extreme case where 5.0,1 =tp  for every t, RCM 
equals 100. To sum up, the closer RCM is to zero, the stronger is the evidence in favor of 
RS. The computed values of RCM for each interest rate, reported in Panel A of Table T3, 
range from 15.638 (India) to 31.101 (Japan), suggesting that RS is a rather good model for 
our data. 
Table T3: 
Model Evaluation Criteria 
 Panel A: RCM 
 France India Japan S. Africa 
RCM 24.324 15.638 31.101 17.415 
 Panel B: In-Sample Forecast Exercise 
 France India Japan S. Africa 
MSFE(AR) 0.302 0.284 0.255 0.258 
MSFE(RS) 0.238 0.219 0.214 0.254 
Ratio 0.789 0.770 0.841 0.986 
Notes: Ratio = [MSFE(RS) / MSFE(AR)] 
 
 However, as already mentioned, RCM is not a formal procedure to test the 
adequacy of RS. We now compare AR and RS in the context of an in-sample forecast 
exercise. 15  More specifically, we use the estimated AR and RS models to generate 
forecasts for the last 100 observations of our sample. We then calculate the Mean Square 
Forecast Error (MSFE) for both models. For each country, we also compute the ratio of the 
MSFE of RS over the MSFE of AR. If this ratio is lower than unity, RS outperforms AR. 
The results, presented in Panel B of Table T3, highlight the superiority of RS over AR. In 
                                                 
15 Unfortunately, we cannot choose between the single-regime AR model and the two-regime RS model by 
means of standard likelihood ratio, Lagrange multiplier and Wald tests because of the existence of nuisance 
parameters which are not identified under the null hypothesis. For this reason, empirical studies choose 
among such models based on simple criteria such as a forecast exercise. 
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general, the results show strong evidence in favor of RS. The only exception is South 
Africa where the superiority of RS is marginal. 
 In summary, the picture emerging from (i) the rolling estimation of AR models, (ii) 
RCM and (iii) the in-sample forecast exercise, support the utilization of RS to describe the 
real interest rates under consideration. 
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Table 1: 
Data Information 
Nominal Interest Rates 
Country Bond Period Source Code 
France 10Y Government Bond Yield 1746-2006 Global Financial Data IGFRA10D 
India Government Bond Yield 1800-2006 -//- IGIND10D 
Japan 7Y Government Bond Yield 1870-2006 -//- IGJPN7D 
S. Africa 20Y Government Bond Yield 1860-2006 -//- IGZAF20D 
CPI % Change 
Country Period Source Code 
France 1950-2006 IFS ifs:s1326400xzfa 
India 1950-2006 -//- ifs:s5346400xzfa 
Japan 1950-2006 -//- ifs:s1586400xzfa 
S. Africa 1955-2006 -//- ifs:s1996400xzfa 
 
Table 2: 
Descriptive Statistics 
 France India Japan S. Africa 
Mean 1.444 1.428 1.423 1.278 
Median 1.456 1.410 1.561 1.368 
Maximum 3.132 2.420 2.135 2.051 
Minimum -0.698 -0.183 -0.042 -1.435 
St. Deviation 0.486 0.393 0.495 0.435 
Skewness -0.590 -0.434 -1.293 -3.232 
Kurtosis 6.764 6.115 4.054 18.160 
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Table 3: 
Certainty-Equivalent Discount Factors 
 
 
Table 4: 
Certainty-Equivalent Discount Rates 
 France India Japan S. Africa Australia Canada Germany UK US 
1 0.04824 0.04484 0.04463 0.03891 0.03608 0.03845 0.04016 0.03601 0.04205 
20 0.04357 0.04342 0.03821 0.03836 0.03145 0.03203 0.03705 0.03486 0.02621 
40 0.04091 0.04204 0.03608 0.03758 0.03045 0.03015 0.03539 0.03455 0.02373 
60 0.03891 0.04069 0.03421 0.03690 0.02987 0.02865 0.03430 0.03420 0.02174 
80 0.03719 0.03946 0.03263 0.03606 0.02949 0.02763 0.03346 0.03385 0.02037 
100 0.03568 0.03826 0.03128 0.03530 0.02914 0.02669 0.03255 0.03353 0.01944 
150 0.03188 0.03510 0.02856 0.03340 0.02829 0.02460 0.03020 0.03272 0.01801 
200 0.02704 0.03114 0.02614 0.03133 0.02728 0.02279 0.02761 0.03166 0.01727 
250 0.02188 0.02542 0.02366 0.02921 0.02601 0.02114 0.02414 0.03011 0.01684 
300 0.01657 0.01822 0.02063 0.02718 0.02407 0.01965 0.01894 0.02689 0.01655 
350 0.01154 0.01098 0.01749 0.02539 0.02078 0.01812 0.01330 0.02157 0.01634 
400 0.01064 0.00858 0.01390 0.02358 0.01654 0.01650 0.00864 0.01262 0.01620 
 
 
 France India Japan S. Africa Australia Canada Germany UK US 
1 0.95398 0.95708 0.95728 0.96255 0.96518 0.96297 0.96139 0.96524 0.95965 
20 0.40911 0.42766 0.46101 0.46765 0.52072 0.50613 0.46873 0.50136 0.57180 
40 0.17939 0.18524 0.22272 0.22208 0.28365 0.27544 0.23058 0.25369 0.34967 
60 0.08214 0.08241 0.11176 0.10697 0.15663 0.15454 0.11630 0.12910 0.22350 
80 0.03899 0.03760 0.05799 0.05224 0.08731 0.08881 0.05975 0.06615 0.14756 
100 0.01908 0.01756 0.03093 0.02590 0.04900 0.05200 0.03123 0.03410 0.09959 
150 0.00365 0.00290 0.00712 0.00479 0.01189 0.01472 0.00666 0.00668 0.03956 
200 0.00085 0.00057 0.00185 0.00097 0.00302 0.00458 0.00160 0.00137 0.01654 
250 0.00025 0.00014 0.00054 0.00022 0.00081 0.00155 0.00045 0.00030 0.00711 
300 0.00010 0.00005 0.00018 0.00005 0.00023 0.00056 0.00016 0.00007 0.00311 
350 0.00005 0.00002 0.00007 0.00001 0.00008 0.00022 0.00007 0.00002 0.00138 
400 0.00003 0.00001 0.00003 0.00000 0.00003 0.00009 0.00004 0.00001 0.00061 
DECLINING DISCOUNT RATES   58  
 
 58
Table 5: 
Weights Used in Aggregation 
 GDP(i) Population in 2005(ii) 
Australia 0.0225 0.0110 
Canada 0.0375 0.0176 
France 0.0644 0.0330 
Germany 0.0846 0.0451 
India 0.1316 0.6022 
Japan 0.1391 0.0699 
South Africa 0.0181 0.0259 
UK 0.0697 0.0326 
US 0.4324 0.1627 
Notes: (i) GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity 
rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the US dollar has in the US. Data 
are in constant 2000 international dollars. Source: The World Bank Group (Ecowin) 
(ii) Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat (2005). World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision. Highlights. New York: United Nations. 
 
Table 6: 
Weighted Average Certainty-Equivalent Discount Rates 
 GDP 
weighted 
Population 
2005 weighted 
1 0.04226 0.04362 
20 0.03252 0.03848 
40 0.02957 0.03578 
60 0.02694 0.03302 
80 0.02479 0.03040 
100 0.02305 0.02795 
150 0.02003 0.02295 
200 0.01833 0.01979 
250 0.01737 0.01799 
300 0.01677 0.01691 
350 0.01633 0.01607 
400 0.01598 0.01543 
 
Table 7:  
Social Cost of Carbon 
Discount Regime Average Lower bound 
(2.5%) 
Upper bound 
(97.5%) 
 Panel A 
GDP weighted $12.60/tonC $3.09/tonC $23.69/tonC 
Population 2005 weighted $8.85/tonC $2.48/tonC $17.99/tonC 
Stern Review (constant 1.4%) $40.15/tonC --- --- 
 Panel B 
GDP weighted (3.5%) 13.18/tonC --- --- 
Population 2005 weighted 
(3.5%) 
9.67/tonC --- --- 
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Table 8: 
 Present Value of benefits per ton of CO2 at selected years. 
Year GDP weighted Population 2005 weighted 
Stern Review 
(constant 1.4%) 
GDP weighted 
(3.5%) 
Population 
2005 weighted 
(3.5%) 
10 0.07422 0.074223 0.095722 0.079695 0.077970 
40 3.42391 2.978002 5.826381 3.578289 3.232165 
60 6.259189 5.127508 12.656796 6.559251 5.602161 
80 8.473170 6.622015 19.500945 8.883658 7.249224 
100 10.00701 7.551510 25.347640 10.488589 8.268427 
150 11.81427 8.507057 34.297050 12.368275 9.304159 
200 12.35556 8.752757 37.941475 12.926665 9.565557 
250 12.52064 8.821988 39.326951 13.096078 9.638309 
300 12.57384 8.843542 39.856331 13.150517 9.660812 
350 12.59195 8.850818 40.063549 13.169037 9.668394 
400 12.59855 8.853500 40.148489 13.175797 9.671199 
 
 
Table 9: 
 Marginal Benefit from CO2 abatement per discounting pattern per year 
Year GDP weighted Population 2005 weighted 
Stern Review 
(constant 1.4%) 
GDP weighted 
(3.5%) 
Population 
2005 weighted 
(3.5%) 
10 0.077404 0.074223 0.095722 0.079695 0.077970 
40 0.168391 0.135621 0.349793 0.176936 0.149159 
60 0.136245 0.097340 0.373440 0.143215 0.107419 
80 0.096196 0.061330 0.332112 0.100839 0.067448 
100 0.061824 0.035586 0.258963 0.064561 0.038879 
150 0.018584 0.008853 0.111828 0.019227 0.009482 
200 0.005538 0.002378 0.042782 0.005693 0.002509 
250 0.001728 0.000707 0.016088 0.001770 0.000739 
300 0.000571 0.000229 0.006176 0.000584 0.000239 
350 0.000207 0.000084 0.002542 0.000212 0.000087 
400 0.000079 0.000032 0.001076 0.000081 0.000034 
 
 
Table 10:  
Social Cost of Carbon per County 
 
 
 
 
Country Average Lower bound (2.5%) 
Upper bound 
(97.5%) 
Australia 11.47 4.92 20.96 
Canada 11.65 1.08 30.23 
France 6.35 1.35 16.18 
Germany 8.64 1.88 19.89 
India 6.36 2.05 14.11 
Japan 8.45 2.69 17.39 
South Africa 7.95 3.07 16.05 
UK 9.41 4.43 16.54 
US 18.39 3.90 31.55 
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Table 11:  
PV of damages in mean GDP per capita for a 400 year horizon (in US$ at year 2000) 
Discount Regime Average Lower bound 
(2.5%) 
Upper bound 
(97.5%) 
 Panel A 
GDP weighted $10505.61 $505.102 $29543.11 
Population 2005 weighted $5056.85 $406.54 $15113.85 
Stern Review (constant 1.4%) $76099.64 --- --- 
 Panel B 
GDP weighted (3.5%) $10832.79 --- --- 
Population 2005 weighted 
(3.5%) 
$5382.90 --- --- 
 
Table 12: 
 PV of mean per capita damages under the baseline scenario by year (in year 2000 $US) 
Year GDP weighted Population 2005 weighted 
Stern Review 
(constant 1.4%) 
GDP weighted 
(3.5%) 
Population 
2005 weighted 
(3.5%) 
1 14.277 14.259 14.675 14.371 14.372 
10 136.697 134.039 154.617 139.419 138.152 
40 444.468 404.961 661.021 460.624 431.261 
60 675.435 578.727 1227.453 703.455 622.879 
80 997.007 793.599 2242.349 1040.976 859.605 
100 1489.678 1089.069 4157.770 1556.273 1183.360 
150 2929.434 1831.449 11662.309 3051.783 1985.852 
200 5559.091 3014.014 29798.564 5762.905 3242.259 
250 8493.470 4243.335 54528.639 8774.102 4533.843 
300 9729.871 4744.146 66868.996 10039.405 5056.683 
350 10267.058 4959.931 73026.858 10588.640 5281.551 
400 10505.612 5056.847 76099.643 10832.793 5382.897 
 
Figure 1:  
Evolution of Benefits from a Reduction of One Ton in CO2 Emissions 
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Figure 2:  
Evolution of Benefits from a Reduction of One Ton in CO2 Emissions by Country 
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Figure 3:  
Evolution of the Present Value of Damages 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
2000 2050 2100 2150 2200 2250 2300 2350 2400 2450
Year
P
V
GDP weight
Population Weight
Constant 1.4%
GDP weight 3.5%
POP weight 3.5%
 
 
 
 
